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Abstract: During the last decade new developments in theoretical and speculative 
cosmology have reopened the old discussion of cosmology’s scientific status and the 
more general question of the demarcation between science and non-science. The 
multiverse hypothesis, in particular, is central to this discussion and controversial 
because it seems to disagree with methodological and epistemic standards 
traditionally accepted in the physical sciences. But what are these standards and 
how sacrosanct are they? Does anthropic multiverse cosmology rest on evaluation 
criteria that conflict with and go beyond those ordinarily accepted, so that it 
constitutes an “epistemic shift” in fundamental physics? The paper offers a brief 
characterization of the modern multiverse and also refers to a few earlier attempts to 
introduce epistemic shifts in the science of the universe. It further discusses the 
several meanings of testability, addresses the question of falsifiability as a sine qua 
non for a theory being scientific, and briefly compares the situation in cosmology 
with the one in systematic biology. Multiverse theory is not generally falsifiable, 
which has led to proposals from some physicists to overrule not only Popperian 
standards but also other evaluation criteria of a philosophical nature. However, this 
is hardly possible and nor is it possible to get rid of explicit philosophical 
considerations in some other aspects of cosmological research, however advanced it 
becomes.  
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1.  Epistemic shifts and theory choice 
“Do we need to change the definition of science?” asked an article in the 7 May 
2008 issue of New Scientist (Matthews, 2008). The occasion for the question was 
the recent appearance of a class of cosmological theories postulating the existence 
of an immense number of universes – a multiverse – rather than the single and 
unique universe in which we live. Multiverse physics or cosmology does not 
agree very well with the standard “definition” (or intuition) of science, which in 
this case was taken to include as a crucial element Popper’s falsifiability criterion. 
The answer of some advocates of the multiverse has been to question or 
disregard the alleged definition of science and to look for a different 
understanding of what characterizes science, one that will allow multiverse 
physics to remain safely within the borders of science. They propose what I shall 
call an epistemic shift.1 
 As I shall use the term (Kragh, 2011), epistemic shifts refer to suggestions 
that traditional criteria of evaluation of scientific theories (or of theories claimed 
to be scientific) are no longer adequate and should therefore be replaced by new 
criteria that better fit the problems under investigation. In so far that they relate 
to the very criteria of what constitutes science, the suggested changes may in 
effect imply a new meaning or definition of what counts as science. They are, and 
are meant to be, changes in the demarcation between science and non-science. 
Such epistemic shifts are related to the paradigm shifts associated with 
                                                          
1  The term ”epistemic shift” is occasionally used in sociological, political and literary 
theory, sometimes with a meaning close to Kuhnian paradigm shifts. In Michel 
Foucault’s structuralist “archaeology” of knowledge, the emergence of political economy 
in the eighteenth century is said to have been an epistemic shift. Again, scholars have 
characterized the modern recognition of a global community with sustainable 
development as an epistemic shift in theories of international politics. 
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revolutions in Kuhn’s philosophy of science, but they differ from them in some 
respects. According to Kuhn’s original view of 1962, methods of a research field, 
including values and rules of theory evaluation, are implicitly defined by the 
paradigm. He nonetheless argued for some timeless elements in science, one of 
them being that acceptability of theories is strongly regulated by observation and 
experiment. Whereas two competing paradigms are incommensurable, this is not 
the case with competing epistemic standards, which mostly differ in the ways 
they evaluate a theory. Given a new theory, which reasons do we have to believe 
in it or take it seriously? On the other hand, an epistemic shift may be so deep 
that it affects the significance of empirical tests, which is generally considered a 
stable epistemic virtue across paradigmatic shifts. 
 The question raised in New Scientist presupposes that there is a generally 
accepted and more or less invariant definition of science, a presupposition most 
philosophers, sociologists and historians of science will probably deny. All the 
same, and restricting myself to the physical sciences, there are undoubtedly some 
criteria of science and theory choice that the overwhelming majority of scientists 
agree upon and have accepted for at least two centuries. In a lecture of 1973, 
Kuhn (1977, pp. 320-339) suggested five “standard criteria for evaluating the 
adequacy of a theory,” namely the following: (1) accuracy; (2) consistency, 
internal as well as external; (3) broadness in scope; (4) simplicity; (5) fruitfulness. 
The first criterion related to the theory’s empirical power: within its domain, 
there must be “consequences deducible from a theory [that] should be in 
demonstrated agreement with the results of existing experiments and 
observations.” Notice that Kuhn did not specifically refer to predictions, except 
that he included them under the notion of “fruitfulness,” and that he apparently 
had confirmation rather than disconfirmation in mind.  
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 Kuhn (1977, pp. 290-291) was aware that the criteria or values may 
contradict each other in a concrete situation and that a relative weighing may 
therefore be needed; but such weighing cannot be unique, and so the system 
cannot fully determine an evaluation in a concrete case. In the context of modern 
cosmology Kuhn’s criteria have been discussed by the cosmologist George Ellis 
(2003; 2007, pp. 1242-1245), who points out that although they are all desirable 
they are not of equal relevance and may even lead to conflicts, that is, to 
opposing conclusions with regard to theory choice. Still, Ellis (and most other 
cosmologists) finds the first of Kuhn’s criteria to be the one that in particular 
characterizes a scientific theory and demarcates it from other theories. Empirical 
testability is more than just one criterion out of many.  
 In cosmology and other areas of fundamental physics it has been agreed 
for more than a century that both when it comes to theory construction (the 
context of discovery) and theory evaluation (the context of justification) 
considerations of an empirical-inductive kind must enter together with 
hypothetical-mathematical considerations in some proper balance that depends 
on the case in question. It is also agreed that the empirical elements need not be 
very important, or can be wholly absent, in the creative or constructive phase of a 
scientific theory.  
 Let me illustrate this consensus view with an address that the eminent 
American physical chemist and mainstream cosmologist Richard Tolman gave in 
1932, shortly after the expanding universe had become generally known. In this 
address, given to the Philosophical Club at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, Tolman distinguished between two ways of constructing cosmological 
models, one guided by observational data and the other – paraphrasing Einstein 
– based on “desiderata for the inner harmony and simplicity of the theoretical 
structure the physicist is attempting to build” (Tolman, 1932, p. 373). Realizing 
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that Einstein had found the field equations of general relativity by the second 
method, Tolman was nonetheless careful to delimit the purely mathematical 
considerations to the construction of theories. The physical principles underlying 
a cosmological theory “must of course in any case agree with observational 
facts,” and even those principles obtained “from the inner workings of the mind” 
must have consequences that can be presented “to the arbitrament of 
experimental test.”  
 This was also Einstein’s view, even as he moved from a cautious 
empiricist position inspired by Ernst Mach to an almost full-blown rationalism. 
In his Herbert Spencer lecture of 1933 he famously stated that “we can discover 
by means of pure mathematical considerations the concepts and the laws …, 
which furnish they key to the understanding of natural phenomena. … In a 
certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the 
ancients dreamed” (Einstein, 1982, p. 274; Norton, 2000). But in between these 
two expressions of his rationalist credo, there was the no less important sentence: 
“Experience remains, of course, the sole criterion of the physical utility of a 
mathematical construction.” As late as 1950, commenting on his new generalized 
theory of gravitation, he readily admitted that “Experience alone can decide on 
truth” (Einstein, 1950, p. 17). As we shall see, similar rhetoric is common among 
modern cosmologists and shared even by many advocates of the existence of 
numerous unobservable worlds. 
 
2.  Examples from the past 
The modern situation in multiverse cosmology is of great interest from a 
methodological point of view, but it is not quite unique in the history of 
cosmological thought. Attempts to introduce major epistemic shifts can be found 
earlier, both in cosmology and in other parts of the physical sciences (Kragh, 
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2011). I shall briefly discuss a couple of episodes from the twentieth century in 
which epistemic shifts were on the agenda and in which a few physicists 
suggested to change the “rules of science” in such a way that the first of Kuhn’s 
criteria was essentially disregarded or given very little significance.2  
 The ambitious project of reconstructing fundamental physics that Arthur 
Eddington pursued between 1929 and his death in 1944 was not a cosmological 
theory as ordinarily understood, but an attempt to unify quantum mechanics and 
cosmology under a single mathematical and epistemological framework 
(Eddington, 1936; 1944; Kilmister, 1994). It was meant to be a theory of 
everything in the physical universe. The goal of the British astronomer was none 
other than to deduce all laws and phenomena of nature from epistemological 
considerations alone, meaning that empirical facts were in principle irrelevant: 
the laws of nature corresponded to a priori knowledge. In the introduction to his 
main work Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons (Eddington, 1936, pp. 3-5), he 
expressed his apriorism as follows: 
All that we require from observation is evidence of identification – that the 
entities denoted by certain symbols in the mathematics are those which the 
experimental physicist recognizes under the names “proton” and “electron.” 
Being satisfied on this point, it should be possible to judge whether the 
mathematical treatment and solutions are correct, without turning up the 
answer in the book of nature. My task is to show that our theoretical resources 
are sufficient and our methods powerful enough to calculate the constants 
exactly – so that the observational test will be the same kind of perfunctory 
verification that we apply sometimes to theorems in geometry. … I think it will 
be found that the theory is purely deductive, being based on epistemological 
principles and not on physical hypotheses. 
                                                          
2  Much has been written about the world systems of Eddington and Milne. References to 
the literature, both primary and secondary, can be found in Kragh (2011). For the steady 
state theory, see Balashov (1994) and Kragh (1996). 
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Despite its a priori nature, Eddington’s theory was rich in empirical 
consequences, resulting in a large number of precise and apparently testable 
predictions (or, in most cases, postdictions). To mention just a few, he claimed to 
have deduced the numerical values of the fine-structure constant 2πe2/hc, the 
proton-electron mass ratio M/m, the cosmological constant Λ, and Hubble’s 
recession constant H0. However, when the predictions differed from the 
measured values, he consistently chose to put the blame on the measurements 
rather than the theory. Indeed he had to, for his unified theory was not testable in 
any real sense. Nor did Eddington consider ordinary testability to be of much 
relevance to his theory of the external world, where empirical facts were seen as 
the necessary consequences of the human mind and not existing in any objective 
sense. The laws and constants that he deduced were true by necessity and thus 
could not conceivably be violated by experiments. For example, he maintained 
that the finiteness and constancy of the speed of light c were given a priori and 
that measurements of c were therefore, in principle, a waste of time (Eddington, 
1946, p. 8).3 No wonder that his theory, although not without influence, was 
dismissed by the large majority of physicists, who either ignored it or severely 
criticized it on methodological grounds. 
 At about the same time as Eddington developed his fundamental theory, 
his colleague in Oxford, the astrophysicist and cosmologist E. Arthur Milne, 
constructed an alternative “world physics” that shared some of the rationalistic 
and aprioristic elements of Eddington’s system. Although their cosmological 
views were very different, the two world systems had in common that they were 
nearly all-encompassing and, on the methodological level, gave high priority to 
                                                          
3  With the spectroscopic redefinition of the metre in 1983 followed a definition of the 
speed of light in vacuum to be exactly c = 299 792 458 m/s (with uncertainty c = 0). Since 
then it has indeed been a waste of time to measure c, but only because c is fixed by 
definition and not for the reasons argued by Eddington. 
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mathematical reasoning and correspondingly low priority to empirical facts. 
Much like Eddington, Milne (1948, pp. 10-12) claimed that ultimately the laws of 
physics could be established from pure reasoning and would then turn out to 
have the character of mathematical theorems:  
Just as the mathematician never needs to ask whether a constructed geometry is 
true, so there is no need to ask whether our kinematical and dynamical 
theorems are true. It is sufficient that the structure is self-consistent and free 
from contradictions; these are in fact the only criteria applied to a modern 
algebra or geometry. … Physicists are not accustomed to reasoning about 
abstract ideas of things; the empirical is always intruding itself, openly or 
tacitly. 
Milne spoke of the “intellectual climate” characterizing his own theory as 
“markedly different from that … of current mathematical physics,” as indeed it 
was.  
 The methodology behind Milne’s world physics is not easily described, 
nor is it perhaps entirely consistent (Cohen, 1950). What matters in the present 
context is only that Milne, although far from unconcerned with observations, 
thought that they just played an auxiliary role in verifying results obtained by 
pure reasoning. His system of world physics could not be falsified by experiment 
or observation. In an important monograph of 1935 he pointed out that 
observation can never tell us whether the universe contains an infinite number of 
objects. Nonetheless, he was convinced that this was actually the case and that it 
followed unambiguously from his theory. “The philosopher,” he wrote, “may 
take comfort from the fact that, in spite of the much vaunted sway and 
dominance of pure observation and experiment in ordinary physics, world-
physics propounds questions of an objective, non-metaphysical character which 
cannot be answered by observation but must be answered, if at all, by pure 
reason” (Milne, 1935, p. 266). 
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 Milne’s ambitious and unconventional attempt to reform physics from 
the bottom up was much discussed for a decade or more. Arthur G. Walker – of 
Robertson-Walker metric fame – was among those who were inspired by Milne’s 
system of what was sometimes known as kinematic relativity. But of course the 
system was also controversial and occasionally it was accused of transcending 
the line separating science from non-science. Among the criteria of science 
adopted by the Cambridge geophysicist Harold Jeffreys (1937) were that a 
scientific theory must not treat any hypothesis as a priori certain, and that alone 
was enough to rule out the theories of Milne and Eddington. According to 
George McVittie, an astronomer and cosmologist of the empirical school, Milne’s 
world physics was essentially to be classified as pseudoscience because it did not 
deal with nature as observed or as revealed to us experimentally. In a critical 
review of Milne’s and Walker’s exposition of kinematic relativity, he fired this 
broadside: “It is eventually borne in on the puzzled reader that Milne and Walker 
are not trying to understand Nature but rather are telling Nature what she ought 
to be. If Nature is recalcitrant and refuses to fall in with their pattern so much the 
worse for her” (McVittie, 1940, p. 281). 
 The later controversy over the steady state theory of the universe, 
pioneered by Fred Hoyle, Hermann Bondi and Thomas Gold in 1948, had some 
elements in common with the methodological dispute of the 1930s. First and 
foremost, the steady state theory was sometimes criticized for resting on a priori 
assumptions such as the perfect cosmological principle, stating that the universe 
is homogeneous in both space and time. This was in fact an unfair accusation, 
witness that in the 1960s the perfect cosmological principle was proved wrong by 
observations – something which is not possible for an a priori principle. Having 
dealt with this controversy elsewhere (Kragh, 1996), here I just want to point out 
that Bondi, in particular, justified the new theory methodologically by explicitly 
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appealing to its high degree of falsifiability in Popper’s sense. Bondi (1992) 
eventually came to the conclusion that, “There is no more to science than its 
method, and there is no more to its method than Popper has said.” The theory 
did indeed lead to several sharp and novel predictions of such a kind that, should 
they turn out to be wrong, the theory must fall. But to critics of the steady state 
theory this was far from reason enough to prefer it over the standard 
cosmological theory based on general relativity. As McVittie had criticized Milne 
for substituting logic for observation, he now complained that the Hoyle-Bondi-
Gold theory was essentially rationalistic and lacked an empirical basis. Among its 
problematic features was that it followed “the dictum that what is logically 
possible is also physically possible” (McVittie, 1961, p. 1236). 
 What caused critics such as McVittie, Herbert Dingle, and Mario Bunge 
to brand the steady state theory as unscientific was in particular the continual 
creation of matter that was an integral part of the theory and necessary for the 
perfect cosmological principle to hold in an expanding universe. In an interview 
of 1978, several years after the original steady state theory had been abandoned, 
McVittie said about the theory’s use of matter creation: “It’s like breaking the 
rules when you are playing a game. If you allow yourself in the game of 
American football to take knives on board with you and stab your opponents, 
now and again, of course the results will be very remarkable, particularly if one 
side only has the knives and the other is merely the recipient” (Kragh, 1996, p. 
249). Clearly, cosmologists in the past were concerned about the rules of science 
that might legitimately be applied to the study of the universe. They still are. 
Thus, Lee Smolin (2008, p. 170) deplores that some advocates of the multiverse 
want to “change the rules so that their theory will not need to pass the usual tests 
we impose on scientific ideas.” 
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3.  The anthropic multiverse: a brief history 
Disregarding the complex history of early ideas of many universes (Kragh, 2009; 
Trimble 2009) one may point to several, largely independent origins of the 
modern concept of the multiverse: 
1.   The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, dating back to Hugh 
Everett’s idea of 1957 but only commonly known after it was presented in a 
modified and more popular form by Bryce DeWitt in 1970. 
2.   The anthropic principle, as formulated by Brandon Carter in an address of 
1973 in which he argued that the weak anthropic principle only had 
explanatory power if associated with the idea of an ensemble of worlds with 
different combinations of initial conditions and fundamental constants.  
3.   The eternal and chaotic inflationary scenarios first proposed in 1982-1983 by 
Andrei Linde and Alex Vilenkin in the wake of the original inflation 
hypothesis of Alexei Starobinski and Alan Guth. 
4.   Mathematical developments in string theory made by Raphael Bousso, Joseph 
Polchinski and others around 2000. This work indicated that there might be 
no unique way to compactify the six extra dimensions of the 10-dimensional 
space-time of string theory and thus produce a unique vacuum state 
describing the one and only universe. 
These four lines of ideas were not initially seen as pointing in the same direction 
or having much, if anything, in common. For example, it was (and still is) unclear 
whether the universes of many-worlds quantum mechanics should be thought of 
as real universes of the same kind as the universe studied by astronomers.  
 Whereas the anthropic principle made contact to the many-worlds 
interpretation at an early date – Carter did so in his 1973 address – it was not 
originally seen as connected to either inflation or string theory. On the contrary, it 
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seemed that inflation theory made anthropic explanations redundant or at least 
limited their domain of application. Why appeal to the anthropic principle to 
explain the flatness of space, if it followed from the inflationary scenario? 
Similarly, string theorists had no sympathy for anthropic ideas, which 
represented an approach to physics quite opposite to the one of string theory 
(Schellekens, 2008). This theory, if successful, would lead to a unique set of laws 
and constants of low-energy physics and therefore make the anthropic principle 
and similar appeals to fine tuning irrelevant (Kane et al., 2002). The situation 
gradually changed in the 1990s, when some physicists began to think of eternal 
inflation as naturally connected to the anthropic principle. While Guth originally 
disliked the anthropic principle, by the late 1990s he found it to be justified as an 
interesting hypothesis by the multiverse generated by eternal inflation (Guth, 
1997). 
 If the modern multiverse is to be assigned a father, a candidate for 
paternity may be Linde, who in 1982 related the inflation bubble-universes to the 
weak anthropic principle. Four years later he made a similar connection to string 
theory (Linde, 1986, p. 399): 
All types of mini-universes in which inflation is possible should be produced 
during the expansion of the universe … From this point of view an enormously 
large number of possible types of compactification which exist, e.g. in the theory 
of superstrings should be considered not as a difficulty but as a virtue of these 
theories, since it increases the probability of the existence of mini-universes in 
which life of our type may appear. The old question why our universe is the 
only possible one is now replaced by the question in which theories the 
existence of mini-universes of our type is possible. 
The multiverse only became a hot issue in the early years of the new millennium, 
with the emergence and promotion of the “landscape” version of string theory 
(Susskind, 2006). According to this version, there is a huge number of vacuum 
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states or possible compactifications, each of them corresponding in the low-
energy regime to a distinct universe with its own laws and constants of physics. 
Moreover, these universes are more than mere mathematical solutions to the 
string equations. They are held to be no less real than the universe we observe – 
the landscape is populated. However, multiverse physicists rarely explicate what 
they mean by existence. For some it is apparently enough that the other universes 
are objects consistent with the basic laws of physics, and they then implicitly rely 
on the magic of the principle of plenitude. From this point of view it is irrelevant 
whether they can actually be detected in the normal, empirical sense (e.g., 
Susskind, 2006, p. 177). 
 The string landscape was offered as theoretical evidence for the 
multiverse, and it provided the associated anthropic principle with a much 
needed support from fundamental physics. What a few years earlier had 
appeared to be an antagonistic relationship between anthropic reasoning and 
string physics, now changed into an alliance. Brian Greene experienced a “sort of 
transformation” which made him “very warm to this possibility of there being 
many universes, and that we are in the one where we can survive,” and he was 
not the only convert (Ananthaswamy, 2009; Siegfried, 2006; Carr, 2007).  
 There are different kinds of multiverses and different ways to classify 
them (Tegmark 2007). The simplest spatial multiverse is uncontroversial, as it is 
realized in many models of the ordinary Friedmann type. Eddington (1931) 
pointed out at an early date that the accelerated expansion of a universe with a 
positive cosmological constant (the Lemaître-Eddington model) will eventually 
lead to “a number of disconnected universes no longer bearing any physical 
relation to one another.” However, these causally disjoint subuniverses have 
evolved from the same universe and they share the same cosmic space-time and 
laws of physics. More interesting are the bubble universes generated by eternal 
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inflation, where there are many big bangs and the universes have different laws 
of low-energy physics, different coupling constants and particle content, and 
perhaps even different dimensionality. Although not accessible to us, they are 
nonetheless genetically connected by, presumably, having a common causal 
origin in a primary big bang. Ellis (2007) has proposed to call universes of this 
type a “multi-domain universe.” 
 In addition to the two mentioned types of multiverse there are more 
radical ideas according to which the multiverse is made up of completely 
separate universes with no regularity in their properties at all. It seems to be 
generally accepted that the latter kind of multiverse, advocated by a few 
physicists, cannot be subject to scientific analysis and must be characterized as an 
interesting philosophical speculation (Ellis et al., 2004). The same is the case with 
the mathematical multiverse hypothesis proposed by Max Tegmark (2008). A 
scientific formulation of these types of multiverse requires some kind of meta-
law valid for the entire multiverse, and it is hard to see how to justify such a 
meta-law. 
 
4.  Testability, falsifiability, and the universe 
It is outside the scope of this paper to analyze the many scientific and 
philosophical aspects of multiverse physics (Carr, 2006; Ellis et al., 2004; Kragh, 
2011), but I want to take up the thread from Section 1 and comment on testability 
as a necessary epistemic standard for cosmological theories. All (or, bearing 
Eddington and Milne in mind, nearly all) physicists agree that testability is an 
epistemic value of crucial importance. They consider it an indispensable 
precondition for a theory being scientific: a theory which is cut off from 
confrontation with empirical data just does not belong to the realm of science. 
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Testability may admittedly not be relevant to all aspects or in all phases of the 
development of a theory, but ultimately it cannot be ignored. Multiverse and 
string theorists are no exception to this rhetorical consensus which finds expression 
time and again in the literature. But one thing is rhetoric, another is scientific 
practice and the interpretation of the concept of testability. Here is a brief list of 
questions that physicists and cosmologists do not agree upon: 
1.   Actual testability (with present instrument technologies or those of a 
foreseeable future) is obviously preferable. But should it be required that a 
theory is actually testable, or will testability in principle suffice? 
2.   Should a theory result in precise and directly testable predictions, or will 
indirect testability do? For example, if a fundamental theory T results in 
several successfully confirmed predictions P1, P2, …, Pn, can prediction Pn+1 be 
considered to have passed a test even if it is not actually tested?4 
3.   If a theory does not result in precise predictions, but only in probability 
distributions, is it then testable? If we can calculate from multiverse or 
anthropic assumptions at a specified confidence level the probability that we 
should observe a physical property, such as the cosmological constant, to lie 
in a certain range, does that mean that the corresponding theory is testable? 
                                                          
4  See, for example, Tegmark (2008, p. 124), who argues that there are reasons to believe 
in untestable predictions if they follow from a well-established theory with empirical 
success. On this account the existence of other universes is “tested” by the successfully 
tested background theories, in this case quantum mechanics and inflation theory. For 
some believers in the many-worlds interpretation, inflation theory is more or less 
redundant, since (they claim) the many universes follow unambiguously as a prediction 
from quantum mechanics. If the many-worlds interpretation is admitted as “the only 
logical interpretation of quantum mechanics,” one also has to admit that “the discovery 
of quantum mechanics was in fact the discovery that gave a solid scientific basis to [the 
multiverse]” (Mukhanov, 2007). On a different note, string theorists sometimes suggest 
that the theory of superstrings has passed an empirical test because it includes 
gravitation without being designed to do so. 
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4.   Will a real test have to be empirical, by comparing consequences of the theory 
with experiments or observations, or do mathematical consistency checks 
also count as sufficient (theoretical) tests? 
5.  Another kind of non-empirical testing is by way of thought experiments or 
arguments of the reductio ad absurdum type that played an important role in 
the controversy over the steady state theory. A cosmological model may lead 
to consequences that are either contradictory or unacceptably bizarre. How 
should such arguments enter the overall evaluation picture? 
6.   At what time in the development of a theory or research programme can one 
reasonably demand testability? Even if a theory is not presently testable, 
perhaps it will be so in a future version, such as there are many examples of 
in the history of science. 
7.   How should (lack of) testability be weighed in relation to (lack of) other 
epistemic desiderata? E.g., is an easily testable theory with a poor 
explanatory record always to be preferred over a non-testable theory with 
great explanatory power? Or what if the testable theory is overly 
complicated, and the non-testable one is mathematically unique and a 
paragon of simplicity? 
To this list may be added the often discussed question of whether or not 
predictions of novel phenomena should be counted as more important than pre- 
or postdictions of already known phenomena. This is a question on which 
philosophers are divided and where the historical evidence is ambiguous (see, 
e.g., Schindler 2008).  
 While most philosophers consider testability to imply not only 
falsifiability, but also verifiability and other forms of theory assessment based on 
empirical evidence, according to Popper (1963, p. 36), “Every genuine test of a 
theory is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it. Testability is falsifiability.” Whatever 
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the validity of this equation, Popper’s falsificationist philosophy has been very 
influential in a broad range of sciences (Mulkay and Gilbert, 1981).5 According to 
the Australian philosopher and critic of Popper, David Stove (1999, p. 8), “if you 
scratch a scientist of middle age or older, you are almost certain to meet with a 
philosophy of science which consists of half-remembered scraps of Popperism.” 
The importance of falsificationist philosophy à la Popper is perhaps particularly 
visible in the fields of astronomy, astrophysics and cosmology. As mentioned in 
Section 2, it played an important role in connection with the steady state theory 
in the 1950s, and scientists (more than philosophers) continue to take it seriously. 
Incidentally, so did Einstein, who was very pleased with Logik der Forschung, 
which he read soon after it appeared in the fall of 1934.6 Popper (1959, p. 313) first 
stated his famous demarcation criterion in a letter to the journal Erkenntnis in 
1933. 
 As shown by Benjamin Sovacool (2005), astronomers and cosmologists 
often invoke Popper’s ideas as a guide for constructing and evaluating theories, 
although they rarely reveal a deeper familiarity with these ideas. In a review of 
the state of cosmology at the millennium, the astrophysicist Michael Turner 
(2001, p. 656) advocated the new standard (ΛCDM) cosmology including 
inflation and cold dark matter by relating it to Popper’s views: “However, with 
its unidentified dark matter and mysterious dark energy, it is currently very 
much out on a limb. According to Karl Popper that’s what strong theories do! … 
Inflation + cold dark matter is bold and testable.” Some years later, Smolin (2007, 
                                                          
5  For a full account of Popper’s view of and influence on cosmology, see Kragh (2012a). 
A revised version of this paper has been accepted for publication in Perspectives on 
Science.  
6  ”Your book has pleased me very much in many ways: rejection of the ’inductive 
method’ from an epistemological standpoint. Also falsifiability as the crucial element of a 
theory (of reality) … . You have further defended your positions really well and 
astutely.” Einstein to Popper, 15 June 1935, as quoted in Van Dongen (2010, p.43).  
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p. 34) argued that Popper’s falsifiability criterion is so basic to science that it 
amounts to an “ethical imperative.” To his mind, it follows from this imperative 
that the anthropic multiverse is excluded from the domain of science.  
 It is an important feature of Popper’s philosophy that a scientific theory 
must set constraints to the results of observations. “Every ‘good’ scientific theory 
is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen,” Popper (1963, p. 36) says. 
“The more a theory forbids, the better it is.” But multiverse cosmology – where, 
in some versions, all that can happen, happens – seems to be anything but 
prohibitive. As Ellis points out, the landscape multiverse allows virtually any 
physical state of affairs: “The existence of universes with giraffes is certainly 
predicted by many multiverse proposals, but universes where giraffes do not 
exist are also predicted. Observing a giraffe neither confirms nor disproves the 
multiverse” (Carr and Ellis, 2008, p. 2.35). The authority of Popper’s view among 
cosmologists is further illustrated by the fact that it is invoked, if not without 
reservations, even by some scientists in favour of the multiverse hypothesis. One 
of them, the French cosmologist Aurélien Barrau (2007), says:  
Except in some favourable cases – for example when all the universes of the 
multiverse present a given characteristic that is incompatible with our universe 
– it is hard to refute explicitly a model in the universe. But … the multiverse 
remains within the realm of Popperian science. It is not qualitatively different 
from other proposals associated with usual ways of doing physics. … Moreover, 
falsifiability is just one criterion among many possible ones and it should 
probably not be over-determined. 
Stephen Hawking is another theoretical physicist in favour of the multiverse. 
Much like Einstein, he praises the power of mathematical elegance and logical 
self-consistency in theory construction. On the other hand, when a theory has 
been constructed by means of such considerations, “The theory then makes 
predictions, which can then be tested by observation.” Moreover: “If the 
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observations agree with the predictions, that doesn’t prove the theory; but the 
theory survives to make further predictions which again are tested against 
observations. If the observations don’t agree with the predictions, one abandons 
the theory” (Hawking, 1994, p. 36). It is unlikely that Popper would have objected 
to this formulation.7 
 Sceptics such as Ellis and Smolin are more inclined to consider the 
multiverse qualitatively different from ordinary physics, perhaps implying an 
epistemic shift. They do not agree that it remains within the realm of Popperian 
science. Neither does the leading multiverse physicist Leonard Susskind, one of 
the fathers of the string landscape, except that for him this is a virtue rather than 
a problem. Why should scientists respect the standards associated with Popper’s 
critical rationalism and promoted by the modern “popperazi”? Susskind (2006, 
pp. 193-195) does not:  
Throughout my long experience as a scientist I have heard unfalsifiability 
hurled at so many important ideas that I am inclined to think that no idea can 
have great merit unless it has drawn this criticism. … Good scientific 
methodology is not an abstract set of rules dictated by philosophers. It is 
conditioned by, and determined by, the science itself and the scientists who 
create the science. … Let’s not put the cart before the horse. Science is the horse 
that pulls the cart of philosophy. ... Falsification, in my opinion, is a red herring, 
but confirmation is another story. 
What Susskind calls confirmation or testing includes mathematical consistency, a 
method of testing that “should not be underestimated.” Schellekens (2008) agrees 
                                                          
7  But Popper’s philosophy is normative. Hawking adds: “Or rather, that is what is 
supposed to happen. In practice, people are very reluctant to give up a theory in which 
they have invested a lot of time and effort. They usually start by questioning the 
accuracy of the observations. If that fails, they try to modify the theory in an ad hoc 
manner.” Hawking’s observation is a rather precise description of how Hoyle reacted to 
the observational problems into which the steady state theory ran in the 1960s.  
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that for the string multiverse “consistency may be the only guiding principle we 
have,” adding that fortunately this is a most powerful principle. 
 Physicists’ and cosmologists’ discussions of the merits and faults of 
Popper’s philosophy of science are often overly simplistic and based on 
misunderstandings (the same was the case with the earlier discussion related to 
the steady state theory of the universe). What they discuss is most often versions 
of naïve falsificationism rather than its sophisticated versions (Heller, 2009, pp. 
88-89). For example, although Popperian methodology rules out a theory if it 
cannot be falsified even in principle, it does not require instant falsifiability. The 
lack of testable implications may not be a permanent feature, in which case the 
theory will be considered a legitimate research project that may well lead to a 
truly scientific theory, such as happened with metaphysical atomism at the time 
of Dalton (Popper, 1974b, p. 981). Popper was well aware that refutation is itself 
fallible and that it may be rational to keep even an admittedly false theory alive 
for some time. Adopting a conventionalist position he even suggested that “the 
testing of a theory depends upon basic statements whose acceptance or rejection, 
in its turn, depend on our decisions” (Popper, 1959, p. 108). Moreover, Popper 
never held that falsifiability is a sufficient condition for a theory being scientific, 
only that it is a necessary condition. There are obviously falsifiable statements 
that do not qualify as scientific. After all, creationist theories that claim the age of 
the Earth to be 6,000 years are eminently falsifiable yet patently non-scientific. 
 There are undoubtedly good reasons for criticizing parts of Popper’s 
view of science, such as many philosophers have done since the publication of 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery more than half a century ago. While Popperian 
falsificationism may have agreed with Einsteinian physics in the early decades of 
the twentieth century, and with the theory of general relativity in particular, in 
other cases it leads to the absurd conclusion that some of the great theories in the 
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history of science were unscientific. Certainly, Popper’s philosophy of science 
bears little resemblance to what most working scientists do today, which has led 
to the suggestion that falsificationism has itself been falsified or is no longer a 
relevant demarcation criterion (Hansson, 2006).  
 Like in cosmology, within some fields of the biological sciences 
Popperian standards are assumed to be authoritative in assessing the scientific 
status of theories. Biologists do not necessarily follow these standards, but they 
generally find them attractive (Rieppel, 2008). On the other hand, and also like in 
cosmology, there are biologists who rather conclude that if their science does not 
live up to Popper’s philosophical views, so much the worse for these views. 
Popper’s claim that Darwinism was not really a testable scientific theory but a 
metaphysical research programme, was not well received by evolutionary 
biologists (Popper, 1974a, p. 134; Yang, 2008). Although Popper soon reversed his 
position and admitted that Darwinian evolution theory was indeed scientific, the 
incident caused some biologists to doubt the epistemic values of falsifiability and 
strict testability. In a paper of 2005 two biologists advocated that their colleagues 
should stop paying attention to the work of philosophers, whether Popper or 
others. Their conclusion, rhetoric and choice of metaphor were strikingly similar 
to those used by Susskind at the same time in the very different field of 
cosmology: “To date, philosophy has been the horse pulling the science cart … It 
might be timely to allow science to play the part of the horse pulling the cart of 
philosophy” (Helfenbein and DeSalle, 2005, p. 279; see also Yang, 2008, who 
explicitly compares the situation in biology with the one in multiverse 
cosmology). 
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5.  Popper on cosmology 
Although of no direct relevance to this paper, it may be useful to point out that 
whereas Popper’s philosophy of science has been highly influential in the 
development of cosmology, the reverse is not the case: physical cosmology seems 
to have been largely unimportant to the emergence and evolution of Popper’s 
ideas. It was a subject he did not deal with in any of his major publications, and 
yet it is not entirely absent from his work. An exception is a little known paper of 
1940 in which he, inspired by Milne’s methods, proposed to interpret the galactic 
redshifts within a conventionalist perspective (Popper, 1940). Although in Logik 
der Forschung he declared that “All science is cosmology,” with the term 
“cosmology” he did not usually refer to attempts to understand the universe on 
the basis of the laws of physics. He mostly used the term in the much broader 
sense of natural philosophy, as “understanding the world – including ourselves, 
and our knowledge, as part of the world” (Popper, 1959, p. 15). 
 In Objective Knowledge, Popper (1972, p. 186, based on a lecture of 1968) 
briefly commented on modern cosmological hypotheses, which he considered 
“the most interesting kind of all hypotheses.” Some of these, he said, “can of 
course be tested, and some have been even sufficiently precise for refutation. But 
others, and very interesting ones, seem to be untestable, and may remain so.” 
Most likely he referred to the steady state theory and the new big bang theory, 
respectively. His most explicit commentary on modern cosmology appeared in a 
lecture given in 1982 at the European Alpbach Forum in Alpbach, Austria. 
According to Popper (1994, pp. 58-60), the Hoyle-Bondi-Gold steady state theory 
– “in my view, a very fine and promising theory” – was not only testable but 
refuted by radio-astronomical measurements in favour of the big bang theory. 
Without speaking out against the big bang theory, he remarked that “we seem to 
be almost as helpless in the field of cosmology in the face of some of these 
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revolutionary results as we are in politics when faced with the task of making 
peace.” While originally admiring the relativistic big bang theory, he came to see 
it as nearly irrefutable and based on illegitimate hypotheses such as the 
cosmological uniformity principle. Even after the emergence of the standard 
model in the late 1960s, he remained opposed to the theory and preferred a kind 
of modified steady state theory that avoided the problem of a finite past (Kragh, 
2012a; Kragh, 2012b). 
 
6.  Whose criteria of science? 
The current discussion concerning the multiverse is of obvious interest to the 
philosophy of science. It involves two major and to some extent related questions 
which may be stated as follows. (i) Has cosmology become truly and exclusively 
scientific, in the sense, accepted by many physicists, that philosophical 
considerations no longer play a legitimate role? If so, has it achieved this 
remarkable status by changing the rules of science? (ii) Which people or groups 
have the “right” to define these rules of science and thus to decide whether or not 
a particularly theory discussed by the scientists is in fact scientific? 
 It is evident that physical cosmology has progressed dramatically for 
nearly a century and made many philosophical views about the universe 
obsolete. We no longer have to appeal to philosophical arguments to know 
whether or not the universe as a whole is a state of dynamical evolution. On the 
other hand, one may doubt if the situation is qualitatively different from the one in 
the 1950s, when Bondi and Gerald Whitrow discussed the scientific nature of 
cosmology in the pages of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Kragh, 
1996, pp. 233-236). Whereas Bondi held that science had now replaced 
philosophy in cosmology, according to Whitrow philosophical arguments would 
always remain an essential part of the scientific study of the universe. 
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 It is far from clear whether some of the recent developments, such as 
multiverse cosmology and physical eschatology, belong primarily to science or 
philosophy. The idea of many universes, traditionally a subject of philosophical 
speculation, is now claimed to have been appropriated by the physical sciences. 
Is this yet another conquest of the ever-victorious physics, at the expense of 
philosophy? “The borderline between physics and philosophy has shifted quite 
dramatically in the last century,” Tegmark comments (Seife, 2004). “Parallel 
universes are now absorbed by that moving boundary. It’s included within 
physics rather than metaphysics.” However, sceptics disagree. As Ellis has 
insisted in several works (2007; Stoeger et al, 2008), there are important problems 
in cosmology that can only be answered, if they can be answered at all, on a 
philosophical basis. One of them is the hypothesis of many universes, another 
concerns the possibility of an infinite number of objects in the universe, and a 
third problem of a philosophical or metaphysical nature is the absolute origin of 
the universe. As a fourth but more dubious problem there is the old conundrum 
of why something exists rather than nothing (Rundle, 2004; Heller, 2009, pp. 177-
190). 
 Some physicists advocating the multiverse and anthropic reasoning have 
questioned whether there is any need for external norms of science of a 
philosophical nature, these norms being Popperian or something else. “If 
scientists need to change the borders of their own field of research,” says Barrau 
(2007), ”it would be hard to justify a philosophical prescription preventing them 
from doing so.” Not only does he argue that physics can only be defined by the 
physicists, he also appeals (somewhat inconsistently) to alternative, non-
Popperian demarcation criteria proposed by “sociologists, aestheticians and 
epistemologists.” Interestingly, he compares the modern developments in 
physics and cosmology with the change that has occurred in the evaluation of the 
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arts: “Nearly all artistic innovations of the 20th century have transgressed the 
definition of art as would have been by a 19th-century aesthetician. Just as with 
science and scientists, art is internally defined by artists.” The comparison seems 
to be flawed. Not only is science a deeply rational affair, which art is not, it also 
successfully aims at describing and explaining the external world in objective 
terms. It is undoubtedly true that much of what is appreciated as great art today 
would not have counted as art at all in the nineteenth century. But the same is not 
true for the sciences, at least not to the same extent. Disregarding extreme 
Kuhnian and Feyerabendian views, the sciences are confined by the laws of 
nature and progress in a much more cumulative manner.  
 The quotation from Barrau expresses a general distrust of academic 
philosophy of science, a wish to ignore what philosophers have to say about the 
difference between science and non-science. It is up to the scientists, and to them 
only, to define the borders of science. As is usual in cases of controversy, this is a 
view that has been contested by other scientists. According to the American 
physicist Robert Ehrlich (2006, p. 282), “decisions as to what constitutes a 
legitimate scientific theory are simply too important to be left to the practitioners 
of that field, who obviously have a vested interest in it, such as a desire to keep 
the funding coming.” The background for Ehrlich’s comment was the anthropic 
string multiverse, but he also had intelligent design and creationist science in 
mind. 
 Unsurprisingly, in this question Susskind sides with Barrau, suggesting 
to forget about normative prescriptions and let the scientists, or perhaps the 
scientific community, determine by way of their practices what is and what is not 
science: “It would be very foolish to throw away the right answer on the basis 
that it doesn’t conform to some criteria for what is or isn’t science” (Brumfiel, 
2006). This is however a problematic argument (Kragh, 2011, p. 365). Not only is 
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it circular reasoning to define science as what scientists do, it also presupposes 
that all scientists have roughly the same ideas of what constitutes science, which 
is definitely not the case. Not even within relatively small fields such as 
theoretical cosmology or systematic biology is there any consensus. Subjects that 
scientists find interesting and discuss at conferences or write articles about in 
peer-reviewed journals do not automatically belong to the realm of science. 
Moreover, it makes no sense to speak of a “right answer” without appealing, 
explicitly or implicitly, to some criteria of science. To conclude that a theory is 
either valid or invalid necessarily involves certain standards of scientific validity. 
These standards need not be part of a rigid philosophical system (“dictated by 
the philosophers”), nor do they have to be explicitly formulated, but it is hard to 
see how they can be avoided. Nature herself does not provide us with the criteria 
for when an answer is right. 
 In any case, if anthropic multiverse physics is accepted as truly scientific, 
it will constitute an epistemic shift, a major methodological discontinuity in the 
history of modern physics. “We are in the middle of a remarkable paradigm 
shift,” says A. N. Schellekens (2008, p. 1), referring to the anthropic string 
landscape. Whether particle physics and cosmology are in fact undergoing a 
revolution and on their way to a new paradigm, or a new set of epistemic 
standards, remains to be seen. 
  
7.  Conclusions 
Neither scientists nor philosophers are usually concerned with the question of 
defining science, scientists because they do not need a definition and 
philosophers because they do not believe there is one. The question has 
nevertheless become relevant in the modern debate about Multiverse or Universe?, 
the title of a book published in 2007 and based on a conference held at Stanford 
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University four years earlier (Carr, 2007). At least some versions of the multiverse 
have come under fire for betraying traditional norms of science, thereby crossing 
the line between science and non-science. This is not the first time such 
accusations have been raised against cosmological theories, nor will it be the last, 
but the present controversy differs in some respects from the earlier ones, such as 
the rationalistic cosmologies of Eddington and Milne and the steady state theory 
of Hoyle, Bondi and Gold. It should also be noted that the anthropic multiverse is 
not the only branch of modern theoretical cosmology that faces problems when 
confronted with testability and other established criteria of what constitutes 
science. So-called physical eschatology, a name used for extrapolations of the 
state of the universe to the far future and the possibility of intelligent life in that 
future, is another research area that gives a nearly free rein to cosmologists’ 
speculations (Kragh, 2011, pp. 332-349).  
 The multiverse debate is to a large extent about the relationship between 
philosophy and physical cosmology, and more specifically about the role of 
empirical testability in the evaluation of cosmological theories. For reasons that 
are in part historical, Popper’s philosophy has dominated much of the debate, 
while alternative conceptions of theory choice and development (such as 
Bayesian approaches and Peircean retroduction) have played a much more 
limited role. Falsifiability remains the crucial issue. While it is taken very 
seriously by the majority of physicists and cosmologists, some protagonists of the 
multiverse claim that even theories of the universe that are, for all practical 
purposes, beyond falsification, qualify as good science. They are not against 
testability, but tend to deny that testability implies falsifiability; and they 
interpret testability more broadly than usual. In effect, they are proposing an 
epistemic shift in the criteria for what should pass as science. 
28 
 
 Perhaps the multiverse will die a natural death, turn out to be merely a 
temporary aberration in the history of modern cosmology. But even then the 
controversy will remain an instructive case for future historians and philosophers 
of science, a case illustrating the ever uneasy relationship between science and 
philosophy. It will be a useful reminder that the definition of science, or the 
demarcation between science and non-science, is not and probably never will be 
a closed chapter in the history of scientific thought.  
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